TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-SERVICE STATION OPERATOR WHO SELLS
GASOLINE TO RECOGNIZABLY INTOXICATED MOTORIST Is NOT

LIABLE FOR INJURIES TO THIRD PERSONS CAUSED BY MOTORIST.

Fuller v. Standard Stations, Inc. (Cal. App. 1967).

Standard Stations, Inc., and Associated Oil Co., operators of separate service stations, both sold gasoline to Herschel Baker, knowing
that he was intoxicated. Shortly thereafter Baker collided with the

automobile in which plaintiff was a passenger, injuring the plaintiff
and killing his father, mother, sister, and brother. Plaintiff sued
Standard and Associated, alleging that they negligently supplied
chattels to Baker, knowing that he would use them in a manner
creating an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to others. The superior

court sustained the general demurrers of Standard and Associated
without leave to amend. On appeal to the Third District Court of
Appeal, held, affirmed: A service station operator who sells gasoline

to a recognizably intoxicated motorist who subsequently injures a
third person is not liable for injuries to that person. Fullerv. Standard
Stations, Inc., 250 Adv. Cal. App. 793, 58 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1967),
petition for hearingdenied, June 28, 1967.

Plaintiff based his complaint upon the negligent entrustment doctrine as expressed in the Restatement of Torts: One who supplies
a chattel for the use of another whom the supplier knows or has

reason to know will likely use it in a manner creating unreasonable
risk of harm is liable for the harm resulting.1 This rule has been
applied in cases involving the entrustment of automobiles to unlicensed minors,2 incompetents,3 and drunkards4 or the entrustment
of dangerous substances to children.5 Although donors and sellers
are potential defendants according to the Restatement doctrine,' the

courts have been reluctant to find liability when title to the chattel
7
passes.
I RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 390 (1965).
2 See, e.g., Shiffette v. Walk-up Drayage & Warehouse Co., 74 Cal. App. 2d 903,
169 P.2d 996 (1946); Edwards v. Benedict, 79 Ohio App. 134, 70 N.E.2d 471 (1946).
3 See, e.g., McCalla v. Grosse, 42 Cal. App. 2d 546, 109 P.2d 358 (1941);
Bensman v. Reed, 299 II1. App. 531, 20 N.E.2d 910 (1939); Golembe v. Blumberg,
262 App. Div. 759, 27 N.Y.S.2d 692 (1941).
4 See, e.g., Krausnick v. Haegg Roofing Co., 236 Iowa 985, 20 N.W.2d 432 (1945);
Crowell v. Duncan, 145 Va. 489, 134 S.E. 576 (1926); Mitchell v. Churches, 119
Wash. 547, 206 P. 6 (1922).
5 See, e.g., Burbee v. McFarland, 114 Conn. 56, 157 A. 538 (1931); Krueger v.
Knutson, 261 Minn. 144, 111 N.W.2d 526 (1961); Henningson v. Markowitz, 132
Misc. 547, 230 N.Y.S. 313 (1928).

0 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390, comment a at 315 (1965).
7 See, e.g., Shipp v. Davis, 25 Ala. App. 104, 141 So. 366 (1932); Estes v. Gibson,
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California, however, appears to accept the Restatement application
to lenders, donors, and vendors alike. In Johnson v. Casetta8 it was
held that an automobile dealer and his salesman could be liable for
injuries to third persons in an accident occurring two weeks after
the tide passed to the purchaser, providing the dealer and his salesman knew that the purchaser was an inexperienced, unlicensed, and
incompetent driver.
Since defendants in the instant case supplied Baker with gasoline,
knowing he would use it in a manner creating risk to others, defendants would seem to be liable according to the general principles of
the negligent entrustment doctrine.
Although the district court recognized the broad principle of liability for negligent entrustment of chattels, it abstained from applying
this principle to the facts of the case. The court reasoned that gasoline and liquor play parallel roles in contributing to an accident
caused by a drunken motorist and since California cases unanimously
declare that the tavernkeeper is not liable for selling liquor to an
obviously intoxicated person, the gasoline seller likewise cannot be
held liable.
In so concluding, the court felt bound by the rule set down in
Fleckner v. Dionne,10 as approved in Cole v. Rush," which declared
as a matter of law that consumption rather than the sale of liquor is
the proximate cause of injuries, and that the tavernkeeper is therefore
not liable.
The Fuller court, in criticizing the tavernkeeper cases, found this
approach remarkable since, "[s]uch declarations form a back-eddy
running counter to the mainstream of modern tort doctrine ...
Current judicial analysis considers the outer boundaries of negligence
2
liability in terms of duty of care rather than proximate causation."'
This allegedly antiquated process of adjudicating negligence led the
court to conclude that controlling precedent "may be unreliable and
ripe for disqualification . . .,,'.
257 S.W.2d 604 (Ky. 1953); Bugle v. McMahon, 265 App. Div. 830, 37 N.Y.S.2d
540 (1942). Contra, Golembe v. Blumberg, 262 App. Div. 759, 27 N.Y.S.2d 692
(1941).

8 197 Cal. App. 2d 272, 17 Cal. Rptr. 81 (1961).
9 Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955); Fleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal.
App. 2d 246, 210 P.2d 530, petilion for hearing denied, December 15, 1949; Hitson
v. Dwyer, 61 Cal. App. 2d 803, 143 P.2d 952 (1943).
10 94 Cal. App. 2d 246, 210 P.2d 530 (1949).
11 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955).
12 250 Adv. Cal. App. at 797, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 794.
's

Id. at 800, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
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In leveling such criticism at the tavernkeeper decisions the Fuller
court failed to recognize expressly that in many California cases, the
term "proximate cause" includes not only questions of fact, but also
questions of law, among which is duty.14 As Professor Prosser observes:
There is little analysis of the problem of duty in the courts. Fre-

quently it is dealt with in terms of what is called "proximate cause,"
usually with resulting confusion. In such cases, the question of what
is "proximate" and that of duty are fundamentally the same:
whether the interests of the plaintiff are to be protected against

the particular invasion by the defendant's conduct. 15

Although the tavernkeeper decisions state that the sale of liquor
is not the "proximate cause" of the injuries, it may be that the court
really meant that there was no duty on the part of the tavernkeeper
to protect third persons not on the premises from injuries at the hands
of the intoxicated customer.
In the few decisions 16 in which liability has been imposed upon the
tavernkeeper without the legislative mandate of a Dramshop Act, 1
the courts found a duty arising from statutes which prohibited the
sale of liquor to certain persons, and the statutes were deemed to
exist for the protection of the public in general.
California law prohibits the sale of liquor to any habitual or common drunkard or to any obviously intoxicated person.'8 While the
California tavernkeeper decisions recognize that the sale is unlawful,'9 they have yet to state dearly whether the statute imposes a duty
of care.
Assuming that the courts had imposed a duty on the tavernkeeper,
there may be distinguishing factors which justify immunity for the
gasoline seller. First, there is no statute forbidding the sale of gasoline to inebriates from which a tort duty can arise. Second, liquor and
14 Prosser, Proximate Cause in California, 38 CALIF. L. REv. 369 (1950).
16 W. PnossER, ToRTs, 333 (3d ed. 1964).

16 Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dept. Store, 269 P.2d 322 (1959); Colligan v.
Cousar, 38 Ill. App. 2d 392, 187 N.E.2d 292 (1963); Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J.
188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959); Schelin v. Goldberg, 188 Pa. Super. 341, 146 A.2d 648
(1958). Contra, Hull v. Rund, 150 Colo. 425, 374 P.2d 351 (1962) (statute prohibiting sale of liquor is penal only).
17 Various types of Dramshop or Civil Damage Acts provide for recovery, against
one who furnishes liquor, for injury or damage: (1) by the intoxicated person; (2) in
consequence of the intoxication of any person; (3) under either circumstance. See
cases collected in Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d 923 (1959).
18 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West 1964).

'9 E.g., 94 Cal. App. 2d at 250, 210 P.2d at 533.
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gasoline play different roles in the chain of events. Liquor directly
affects behavior and thereby fosters negligence. Gasoline is the link
between a negligent actor and his instrument of destruction, but it
does not affect behavior or directly cause injury. In terms of the social
desirability of eliminating drunken driving it would be more effective
to control the source of liquor than the source of gasoline.
Consider also the difference between gasoline and other chattels
involved in negligent entrustment decisions. The chattels entrusted,
whether automobiles, 20 boats, 21 guns, 22 ammunition, 23 or inflammable
chemicals, 4 have all been instrumentalities causing direct harm. Gasoline, on the other hand, merely makes it possible for an accident to
occur.
In Toole v. Morris-Webb Motor Co.2 5 it was held that an automobile dealer who loaned license plates to a known inexperienced
driver could be liable when the driver negligently injured a third person. Like the gasoline seller, the automobile dealer provided a chattel which made it possible for the car to be driven. In other cases
dealing with license plates, however, the courts have said that there
is no causal connection between the act of lending the plates and the
injury.26
27
With the exception of Toole and several tavernkeeper decisions,
no case was discovered where a court extended liability to a supplier
of a chattel which created a necessary condition for the occurrence
of an injury but which did not itself cause injury. Thus, if it is
questionable that the sale of gasoline is a cause in fact, there would
be no point in imposing a duty on the station operator not to sell.

If the sale of gasoline can be a cause of injury, there may exist few
circumstances in which a jury would actually find it so. For example,
20 Cases cited notes 2, 3 and 4 supra.
21 Mikel v. Aaker, 256 Minn. 500, 99 N.W.2d 76 (1959).
22 Neff Lumber Co. v. First Nat'l Bk., 122 Ohio St. 302, 171 N.E. 327 (1930);
Henningson v. Markowitz, 132 Misc. 547, 230 N.Y.S. 313 (1928); Wassel v. Ludwig,
92 Pa.Super. 341 (1928).
23 Anderson v. Settergren, 100 Minn. 294, 111 N.W. 279 (1907); Driesse v.
Verblaauw, 9 N.J.Misc, 173, 153 A. 388 (1931); Mautino v. Piercedale Supply Co.,
338 Pa. 435, 13 A.2d 51 (1940).
24 Clark v. Ticehurst, 176 Kan. 544, 271 P.2d 295 (1954); Krueger v. Knutson,
261 Minn. 144, 111 N.W.2d 526 (1961).
25 180 So. 431 (La. 1938).
26 See, e.g., Fredericks v. Birkett L. Williams Co., 68 Ohio App. 217, 22 Ohio Op.
360, 40 N.E.2d 162 (1940); Burke v. Auto Matt, Inc., 37 N.J. Super. 451, 117 A.2d
624 (1955); Endres v. Mara Rickenbacher Co., 245 Mich. 5, 219 N.W. 719 (1928).
27 Cases cited note 16 supra.
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in the instant case the accident occurred a few moments after Baker
left the second service station he visited that day.28 Unless Baker's
tank was nearly empty, the sale of gasoline by that station owner
did not in any way add to the probability of the accident's occurring.
Arguably then, the gasoline from the station previously visited could
have been the cause of the accident. But under most circumstances the
station would be one visited on an earlier day when the driver presumably would have been sober. In order for the jury to find that a
particular sale provided the gasoline powering the automobile at the
time of the accident, it would have to consider evidence of the number of gallons sold, speed, road conditions, and other factors which
affect the mileage of a vehicle. The problems of evidence and proof
might make a rule imposing duty on the gasoline seller unworkable
and unenforceable.
In view of the distinguishing factors above, the result in Fuller
should remain unassailable even if the tavernkeeper decisions are
overruled.
DONALD
28

Opening Brief for Appellant at 1.
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